GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

SPECIAL REPORT

SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART XX

BRITAIN AND THE TIENTSIN PROBLEM

(15 Jun - 23 Aug 1939)

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THE SAIONJI - HARADA MEMOIRS

PART TWENTY: BRITAIN AND THE TIENTSIN PROBLEM

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Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 329
(15 June 1939)

Premier Reports on Alliance

Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto

I returned on the 5th and since I had a slight cold, I couldn't see anyone personally. However, on the morning of the 8th I met the Minister and Vice-Minister at the Navy Minister's official residence for the first time in a long while. The Vice-Minister stated: "The point on which the Army and Navy can be considered to have concurred is the fact that they would like to establish this treaty. The point that it isn't good to say that we will participate unconditionally in war, and the point which has been brought up before, are the only two points on which the Army and Navy concur. The origin of our discussion was that we should settle the matter by using even just these two points on which we concur as the foundation. The first plan of the Army called for participation in war to some extent, that is, participation in a wide sense. This time, the framework is based on the fact that we will not participate unconditionally in war. Of course, if Soviet Russia enters, Japan will give military aid no matter what the circumstances may be. However, if Soviet Russia does not enter and war does break out between England and France on one side and Germany and Italy on the other side, then depending on the circumstances at that time, we may actually participate in the war from the beginning, or we may join in from the middle, or we may not participate at all. The Navy was able to compromise with the Army on the key note of this last instance that we would not have any connections from beginning till end - in other words,

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that we would not participate in war."

He stated further: "Besides the telegram which was sent by the Foreign Minister to Ambassador OSHIMA on June 5th, the matter which was determined at the Five Ministers' Conference on June 6th related to the attitude our country should take in case the United States took part in the war on the side of England and France. In case of 'b' and 'c' of No. 2 of the telegram plan: 'Should the United States enter the war before the Soviet Union is involved, and should Japan, from general circumstances, constitute a silent threat toward checking their participation in the war, and should this be advantageous to the third party, she may not express any intention, nor send any armed forces. However, even in this instance, she will, of course, confer with Germany and Italy.' The conference was adjourned after this memorandum was drawn up."

On the afternoon of the 8th, I reported recent developments to Prince SAIONJI by writing him a detailed letter. I phoned the Foreign Minister on the morning of the 9th, but there didn't seem to be any definite answer from Germany as yet. The Foreign Minister said that it looked as if we would transmit our message after reconsidering the details of the treaty and after deliberate study. Judging from our attitude until now, it will take some time before matters become unified.

Early on the morning of the 10th, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his private residence. I reported to him on the recent circumstances. He told me: "The Premier seemed very cheerful due to the establishment of the treaty; that is, the fact that the Army and Navy

had concurred. When he visited the Palace on the 9th, I saw him for a short while, and he seemed quite cheerful. After the Premier had an audience with the Emperor, the Emperor even said: 'HIRANUMA was feeling very good today.' He (HIRANUMA) seemed quite at ease. Until now, Premier HIRANUMA leaned solely toward the Army. Now, for the first time, he told the Emperor that the reasoning of the Navy was just; that is, that the Navy was right. This was very unusual. The Premier also said that Ambassador SHIRATORI was very unpopular everywhere and if this problem isn't solved, he will be recalled. It also looks as if it has been decided at the Cabinet meeting to establish a government of centralized authority headed by WANG Ching-wei. Although Premier HIRANUMA, until recently, thought that we should deal with CHIANG Kai-shek, he has shelved this idea as the plans of the Army matured. It still seemed as if this movement concerning WANG Ching-wei would even now bring an uneasy feeling."

At 11:00 o'clock, I met the Premier at his official residence for the first time in a long while. He talked about the progress until the establishment of the treaty and the mission of Japan and the United States in contributing to world peace.

I also met the Foreign Minister at his official residence at 3:00 p.m. We discussed many matters for about an hour. He said anxiously: "We do not know whether the problem of WANG Ching-wei can be carried out smoothly. However, it has been decided to push the matter through like that. As for CHIANG Kai-shek, I think that even if we were to make an overture now, he

probably wouldn't take it. In any event, since KONOYE Fumitaka doesn't understand anything yet, it's annoying unless he is quite careful."

Before I met the Foreign Minister, I ran into KONOYE by chance, at the Peers' Club at noon. As we talked, KONOYE stated that he was meeting the War Minister at 2:30 p.m. to hear about recent developments on WANG Ching-wei. Concerning the fact that there was a faction in General Staff Headquarters who said it would be better to negotiate directly with CHIANG Kai-shek, he said: "I would like to find out the actual facts, and I would also like to hear about the progress made on WANG Ching-wei." I said: "To meet the War Minister is one method. However, before that, you should have some preliminary knowledge. Why not call a secretary of the Asia Bureau who is taking care of those matters in the Foreign Ministry?" I asked Secretary OKUMURA to come over. I had KONOYE listen to the many facts. KONOYE said: "This was very good reference," and went to meet the War Minister at 2:30 p.m. At 3:00 o'clock, I met the Foreign Minister as stated previously.

That night, I was invited to the Peers' Club for the 23rd anniversary of the death of Home Minister KIDO's father.

On the night of the 10th, I came to Oiso as I wasn't feeling well. At noon on Sunday, the 11th, YAMASHITA phoned saying he had invited the Governor-General of Formosa to lunch at his villa at Atami and why don't I come also? I invited IKEDA of Oiso and we went to have lunch. I returned around 4:00 o'clock.

At 8:00 o'clock, Gen. TERAUCHI came over for the

first time in a long while. During the conversation, TERAUCHI stated: "You can practically say that nowadays, we never hold meetings of the War Councillors. Some time ago, we received a report concerning the problem of the treaty. It is said that the plan which was decided upon at the Five Ministers' Conference was changed without permission by the Foreign Ministry and sent out. Isn't this a shameful story?" I told him: "That is a big mistake. If the War Minister said that, the War Minister made a false report, and that is bad." TERAUCHI stated: "He is certainly an outrageous person." He was indignant over the fact that they had received a false report from the Minister. He added: "In any event, the lack of discipline in the Army is certainly inexcusable."

On the 12th, there was a general meeting of the Kosei-kai, and I went to Tokyo. Since it was over before noon, I went to Sumitomo and took care of various business matters. I met OGURA. I called Prince SAIONJI's place from the firm, and made preliminary arrangements as MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was going to Prince SAIONJI's place on the 13th. In the afternoon, I talked to the Foreign Minister by phone. Foreign Minister ARITA stated: "We had a telegram from SHIRATORI saying that he had talked to Foreign Minister CIANO regarding the matter of the treaty. Foreign Minister CIANO had no objections and said: 'It's all right.' He added: 'Please talk to Germany about it.' SHIRATORI left for Berlin at once."

That evening, I returned to Oiso. MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, went to Okitsu on the afternoon of the 13th, and stopped

off at Oiso on his return. He told me what he had talked about to Prince SAIONJI.

On the morning of the 14th, I talked to YAMAMOTO, the Vice-Minister of Navy, by phone. He stated: "The Tientsin problem is certainly an unpleasant one. It would be distressing if that matter were to be magnified. As for the Navy, it intends to make them solve the problem locally as much as possible."

At noon on the 15th, HIROTA, the former Premier, came to Oiso for the first time in a long while. As we lunched, we talked about various matters: HIROTA stated: "Since the time I was in Holland, I have been watching the economic measures, the financial measures and their success, in the various countries of Europe since the end of the World War. After this war is over, in case the value of the yen, or in other words, if the rate of exchange of the yen should fall, counter-measures as to methods to prevent it from falling and what disposition to take when it does fall, are very important problems for Japan. It may give rise to a disturbance within the country. There is fear of the danger that it might cause bad results in the loss of confidence at home, extending to foreign nations." He was very worried.

Regarding the talk between the Prime Minister and DOOMAN, I asked HIROTA: "Do you have anyone in mind in the right-wing (who knows about this matter)?" HIROTA said: "Isn't it perhaps TSURUMI Yusuke?" He continued: "The reason is that TSURUMI Yusuke came often to say such things when I was Prime Minister and again Foreign Minister."

On the morning of the 16th, I talked to the Chief

Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal by phone. He said that when His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, visited the Palace on the 15th and had an audience with the Emperor, the Emperor inquired about the Tientsin Incident. His Imperial Highness reported: "When England hands over the criminal, it will be distressing if it is done as a bargaining point. However, if it isn't a bargaining point or anything, General Staff Headquarters will acknowledge the good faith, and intends to return the matter of the settlement to its original state voluntarily." The War Minister was also there at that time. Judging from the fact that he made no remarks from the side regarding the report of His Imperial Highness, the Chief of General Staff, it can be thought that he had no objections to the matter as reported by His Imperial Highness.

It is difficult to tell what has happened to the problem of WANG Ching-wei. From Oiso, I asked Secretary OKUMURA of the Asia Bureau concerning the problem of WANG Ching-wei. He stated: "The matter has been progressing satisfactorily. There are still two or three points which have not been agreed upon. However, they are to be settled as soon as possible, and he is supposed to return to his country within four or five days. On one hand, we stopped Maj. ONODERA from advancing any more than that."

Several days ago, KONOYE said: "I have been gathering the telegrams of the War and Foreign Ministries and looking at them. I think that War Ministry telegram, No. 235, dated August 29, 1938; that is, from the Vice-Ministers of War and Navy to OSHIMA and KOJIMA, the military attaches, and the telegram from the Vice-Minister

of War on the same day to OSHIMA explaining War Ministry telegram, No. 235; were very much the source of the error. Won't you get these telegrams for me?"

Therefore, I asked Captain TAKAGI of the Navy and collected the telegrams at once and looked at them. At that time, Captain TAKAGI wrote:

I have enclosed the matter which we discussed confidentially the day before yesterday, so please consider it.

The contents of this telegram indicate the mistaken interpretation of the Navy Ministry of what was decided at the Five Ministers' Conference and also changes in the assertions of the Army. Since the Navy Ministry does not wish to show this to outsiders, please take this into consideration and return it after you are through.

The following telegram is War Ministry telegram No. 235:

1. Both the Army and Navy are in agreement with the purport of the treaty plan which was brought by Maj. Gen. KASAHARA. The opinion to adopt this concurred upon the following conditions:

a. Add the following essentials as the preamble. (Plan for preamble omitted).

b. Change 'diplomatically' of Article 2 to 'economic'.

c. Change the end of Article 3 from: 'there is an obligation to perform' to 'will enter into a conference immediately'.

d. The phrases, 'menace and attack', of Articles 2 and 3 will be designated as: 'unless provoked'.

e. It is our opinion that we would like to prescribe clearly and in detail, the methods of execution

and limit of the sphere of the conditions of military aid to be given in accordance with the secret treaty to be attached to the main treaty.

2. Since we desire to conclude this treaty as promptly as possible, we wish Germany would take steps to submit this plan formally soon.

Explanations concerning War Ministry telegram, No. 236:

1. 'The Preamble Draft' is that this treaty is an extension of the existing Anti-Comintern Pact, and is a plan which makes clear the intent that the Soviet Union is the chief target. Care was taken so as not to give the impression from the wording that England and the United States are the greatest enemies.

2. The Text Plan, Obligation of Military Aid in Article 3, is not instantaneous or unconditional. In order to nullify the danger of becoming involved in a purely European problem against our will, a conference before we enter with military aid is the principle.

3. In order to allow the purport of this treaty to take on a defensive character, 'menace and attack' will be limited to 'provocation'.

4. Furthermore, the text of the plan is at present under zealous consideration."

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Chapter 330
(24 June 1939)

Emperor Studies Tientsin Case

Translated by S/Sgt Jack Tashiro

On the 15th, when the Chief of the General Staff Headquarters proceeded to the Imperial Palace, the Emperor had some questions about the development of the Tientsin problem and the course the Army was going to take. However, His Highness, the Chief of the Army General Staff, said that his desire was to have a discussion with the Army before replying to the Emperor and departed.

On the 16th, the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister proceeded to the Imperial Palace and received permission to see the Emperor at the same time. Then the Chief of the General Staff said: "In regards to the Tientsin problem, it would be embarrassing to the Army should England insist on handing over the offenders as bargaining condition, but if the sincerity of the English can be trusted, then we are planning to solve the problem as originally planned." At the time of the address to the Emperor, as previously stated, the War Minister was present and he was listening carefully to the conversation. Although the real motive for the request of the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister for an audience with the Emperor is not known, it seemed that they wished to increase the number of divisions.

After the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister left, the Emperor summoned the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and said: "Just now, the Chief of the

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General Staff said that in case the British should hand over the offenders and if it is some sort of bargaining condition, then, we would be embarrassed. But if we are to trust their sincerity, then we should have the courage to settle the problem as it is. Pass this incident on to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and have him talk to the Premier. If by chance, the Army should say this or that concerning this problem I shall talk to them."

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal accepted the Emperor's order and talked to the Minister of Foreign Affairs about it. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs conveyed this to the Premier, he immediately summoned the War Minister. When he questioned the War Minister, the War Minister said: "When His Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, was received in audience, I was also there. The Chief of the General Staff did not say that. That is, the Chief of the General Staff stated: 'After attaining the objective.'" So, the Premier spoke to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on this matter and the Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The War Minister also said: "Concerning this problem, I will reply through a military aide-de-camp and you (Premier) reply thru the Minister of Foreign Affairs." When the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal conveyed this result to the Emperor, the Emperor said: "The way I heard it was that after they handed over the offenders, we should trust their sincerity and come to a settlement. It did not sound like attaining the objective."

But, as before, the War Minister was arguing strongly with the Premier and the Minister of Foreign

Affairs. When it comes to the contents of attaining the objective there are two main points; one point is that we should make them cooperate to maintain peace; and the other point is that it is a necessary condition for the existence of the Army. So, the Emperor told the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: "It is not good to have such mistakes. Anyway, shall I call the Premier and tell him?" The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "If you summon the Premier immediately, it will create an uneasy feeling. I think it best if you summoned His Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, and make this point certain." Then, the Emperor said: "Summon the Chief of the General Staff to come to the Palace. The Chief of the General Staff said: "What I said yesterday was insufficient so I will supplement it." His Highness brought some written material which contained the plans for attaining the objective. That is, there are besides the two points, the previous five conditions. The general outline is written in the newspapers. For instance, Kempei will be put into the Industrial Bureau and the Industrial Bureau will cooperate with Japan to maintain peace and order. Furthermore, a reserve fund of 5,000 Yuan will be provided. When the Emperor asked the Chief of General Staff whether the economic problems were included, His Highness replied: "There is none involved." Although the Emperor asked again, the Chief of the General Staff replied: "Although it is not involved, there is some connection." At this time the Emperor questioned: "Leaving the economical problem out, is it all right if the government says that it is a problem of the government and that they will handle it?" The

Chief of the General Staff said: "Then, that is fine." But, the Emperor immediately said: "Will the War Minister agree with that opinion?" Then the Chief of the General Staff said: "That, I do not know."

On the 17th, the Premier went to the Palace and when he met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, he said that the War Minister was saying that naturally there are economic problems involved. He (Premier) also said that the Chief Aide-de-Camp was saying that it's very distressing to say that what the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister said are different.

Another entirely different matter is brought up here. Prince CHICHIBU who had returned from North China reported to the Emperor. His Highness said that Lt. Gen. HOMMA, commander of the division stationed in Tientsin, said that if it's just handing over the offenders, then the various nations would probably back up Japan but it won't be that way if economic problems are involved. He also said that Japan's position would become very unfavorable. Although YAMASHITA, Chief of Staff of the North China Headquarters, is issuing stern orders, Lt. Gen. HOMMA is checking it. Considering these facts, the War Minister maintains the opinion of YAMASHITA, the Chief of Staff; and the General Staff Headquarters maintains the opinion of Division Commander HOMMA. It appears that the differences arise from this.

Around the 16th, a reply that Germany would not accept the term proposed by the Japanese government came from Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. Since they advise that the 2nd GAUSS Proposal be used, the General Staff

Headquarters is trying to push this through. However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said: "Although it appears in same on the surface, I oppose proposals that have such differences." On the other hand, it seems that the Minister of Foreign Affairs wishes to begin negotiations in Tokyo about the Tientsin Incident.

From exactly four or five days before, the Navy Minister had travelled to Niigata so it didn't seem right to open the Five Ministers' Conference. Both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Navy overlooked the attitude of the General Staff Headquarters concerning the problem referring to the agreement and it seemed that the meantime they will leisurely discuss the matter. The Five Ministers' Conference has not been convened.

On the 19th, when I (HARADA) went to Oiso and met IKEDA, the former Minister of Finance, he said: "Since HATTA, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, said that there would be a great political change in June, ask him the reason." On the 20th, I phoned the Minister of Commerce and Industry and he said: "There are some who are saying that the Cabinet is going to collapse because of the treaty problem."

When I went to Tokyo on the 22nd, I heard that Gen. UGAKI was active. I met TSUGITA and asked him the conditions and naturally, it was a rumor. In the meantime, under the expectation that there would certainly be a political change, rumors are rampant and some are worrying.

The present problems are the treaty problem and the Tientsin Incident. On the 22nd and 23rd, some

100 Soviet planes came to Nomonhan and half were shot down. On the morning of the 24th, I talked over the phone with YAMAMOTO, the Navy Vice-Minister, and he said: "The Nomonhan Incident might get bigger. It seems that Russia has three field divisions prepared in that area, so it may not end with this (the Nomonhan Incident)."

Since YONAI, the Navy Minister, had returned from Niigata, I talked with him over the phone and he said that there are many questionable points in this treaty problem. He was suspicious of the attitude of the Premier and he seemed to have much suspicion concerning the moves of the Army.

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Chapter 331
(1 July 1939)

Konoye's Visitors

Translated by S/Sgt Jack Tashiro

On the evening of the 24th, MATSUDAIRA, who came from Tokyo, said that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal heard from the Emperor that it seems the intention of the General Staff Headquarters to hold the Foreign Ministry responsible for the Anti-Comintern (policy). As a result of sounding out CRAIGIE, the story is that it would be troublesome to have Japanese in the Industrial Bureau but the others of the five conditions concerning the Tientsin Incident might be recognized. Concerning the economic question, there are detailed agreements, and it seems that there will be a need for someone to go to Tientsin for cooperation. Furthermore, concerning the economic problem, in view of the fact that they (British) intend to commence negotiations after the offenders are handed over, it seems that they will not take such a firm stand.

If we look into the contents of the wire sent from the commander there to the Army high command concerning the Nomonhan Incident, the airplanes, flying technique, and the mechanized units of Russia are inferior to the Japanese. However, the Russian artillery is superior to Japan's. The report also states that the Japanese have not used the experience gained at Changkufeng in this battle at all. As I previously stated, this is the story that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal received from the Emperor.

Then, I talked over the phone with the Minister of

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Foreign Affairs and he said: "We will commence negotiations on the Tientsin Incident in Tokyo. Of course, we will summon people from that area. I told them last night that the problems were: first, to maintain peace; second, the problem of currency and the problem of the dormant capital in the British Settlement in Tientsin (original parenthesis: since this has direct bearing on the basic problem, the settlement will probably be slowed up); and third, the problem of handing over the offenders. The Japanese Government agreed with England's desire to meet CRAIGIE and commence negotiations in Tokyo. Since the Anti-Comintern problem is not urgent, it may be postponed." It was the intention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to settle the Tientsin problem and then go into the Anti-Comintern matter. The Minister of Foreign Affairs said: "Although the Vice-Minister of War told the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Army wants to have the Anti-Comintern Pact settled the way they desire, the Foreign Ministry cannot just do as the Army says."

I talked with the Navy Minister over the phone and he said: "There is great doubt on the attitude of the Premier concerning the attempt to make them settle on the 2nd GAUSS proposal advocated by the Army."

I went to Shizuura on the evening of the 25th and when I met the Prince at 10:00 a.m. the following morning (26th), I gave him a general report. He said: "This is very distressing; I wonder what they are planning to do towards England. The Army's highhandedness probably will not cool down. Among the recent telegrams from the Ambassadors overseas, I think that SHIGEMITSU's wire is

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still the most logical. He is a good man." The Prince was going to go to Gotemba in the summer.

I left, but on the way home, I stopped and looked up IKEDA in Oiso and discussed recent happenings. On the 27th, I returned to Tokyo and I went to the Palace and met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at 10:30 a.m. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was very worried about the Tientsin Incident and since there was no special topic I left after about an hour. If I move around too much, I become tired, so I rested all afternoon.

On the 28th I had breakfast with KONOYE. During the course of the conversation, KONOYE said: "There was a conference of the Privy Council this morning. A government official explained, to a certain extent, the problem of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs. Since the problem was logical and the argument very good, I thought the problem was finished. However, KOISO, the Minister of Overseas Affairs, stood up and said: 'I will supplement the explanation.' Since KOISO's talk was so unreasonable and fantastic, Privy Councillor FUKAI made a severe attack on the explanation of the Minister of Overseas Affairs. The Minister left without a word. It seems that KOISO is trying to show off in too many of the problems and he is bungling."

Then KONOYE also talked about the time he met WANG Ching-wei. WANG had said: "Unless Japan eases up in her relations with England, it makes it very difficult for us. I think that an army is always essential and I prefer HO Ying-chin's army. It is disturbing when there is too much interference in our internal affairs. If something too difficult is requested, we may not be able

to do it. Although the Japanese consider KAO Tsung-wu bad, he is not fickle. Although there are many like me in the Chungking Government circles, it is very difficult for them to escape. If we are to rely on airplanes, it has to be at night and if we attempt to escape in a plane, security at the airfield is very strict and escape is very difficult." WANG also mentioned the sufferings of SUN Yat-sen and the real intentions of (omitted in document) during the establishment of the Kuomintang. He was speaking of the past with tears. KONOYE's conversation was as stated above.

INUKAI came to see me later and said that WANG Ching-wei was deeply impressed after meeting KONOYE and had stated that Prince KONOYE was an excellent statesman. Since Japan has such a man, WANG stated that Japan's future is really hopeful and praised the character and knowledge of KONOYE.

On the morning of the 29th, I met the Navy Minister and the Vice-Minister at the official residence. According to what was said then, the Anti-Comintern problem, if handled awkwardly, can bring danger to the nation. As far as the Navy is concerned, it is not a regional problem. Since it is actually a problem of whether the Navy can or cannot assume the responsibilities of national defense, the attitude of the Navy is the same as before. He showed the firm determination for unity within the Navy.

On the morning of the 30th, some Kempei came to my place and asked: "Is it true that Prince KONOYE is going to organize a new political party?" I replied: "I don't know about such things." I was asked: "Men

like AKIYAMA and KAMEI have already made about 150,000 placards, and in the middle of each placard, there is a picture of Prince KONOYE." I thought it rather strange, but I said: "Someone must have done it on his own hook." They continued: "It seems as if KONOYE, KIDO, ITAGAKI and a few others assembled at the home of Gen. HAYASHI Senjuro on the evening of the 27th and had a secret discussion. Late that night, KONOYE and HIRANUMA left Tokyo and went to Yokohama where they met secretly. This fact leaked out from a member of the police." To me this was such a comical incident that I called up KIDO and he said: "Naturally, that's not true. Not only that but KONOYE and HIRANUMA never met. Furthermore, they never met at the home of HAYASHI Senjuro." So, I told the same to the military police.

I met ARITA and KONOYE at the Kuwana that afternoon at 2:30, so I mentioned the story to KONOYE. He said: "AKIYAMA came the other day and showed me the placard. AKIYAMA said that they had been made in September of last year. They didn't need them, but it was brought over to be shown to me."

Leaving aside the fact whether KONOYE does or does not emerge, I think that since they cannot speak of the placard directly, AKIYAMA showed the placard to KONOYE in this manner so that when KONOYE takes active part in politics, it can be said that he knew about the placard. Not only that, but it seemed that KAMEI went constantly to talk about KONOYE's son Fumitaka; in other words, at KONOYE's place, he talks of Fumitaka, but it seems that he is announcing that he meets KONOYE to discuss the plans for the establishment of a new political party.

It seems that he also makes it known that he (KAMEI) acts as the central figure in the cleaning up of the affairs of Fumitaka. I told KONOYE this and he talked of various things.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs said that the War Minister and the Premier met the other day and the Minister of War was hurrying the Anti-Comintern problem. Since the War Minister asked them to settle on the Army's decision, the Minister of Navy was called by the Premier. The Navy Minister said to the Premier: "The last telegram we sent to Germany was decided upon by the Army and Navy after careful deliberation, so it is very difficult to change." But, the Premier said: "I want the Army and Navy to make further research." It seems that the Minister of War replied: "You can't leave everything up to Army and Navy." After the Minister of War left, the Premier said to the Minister of the Navy: "Since the Minister of War has that attitude he probably won't listen to his subordinates, and he probably doesn't understand what we are talking about. This is very distressing." This time, the Premier seemed to agree with the opinion of the Navy Minister. It also appears that he is upholding the contentions of the Navy. The Navy Minister told the Minister of Foreign Affairs that there never was a time when the Premier showed his attitude so clearly.

The other day, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs said: "The problems that are to be discussed in Tokyo are very difficult. Even if progress is good, it will not be favorably taken; if it goes badly, then it is worse. Although the Minister of Foreign Affairs is a target of

criticism and I am prepared for that, it is very distressing to have the Rightists interfere with the various problems unnecessarily."

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Chapter 332
(11 July 1939)

Emperor Berates Itagaki

Translated by S/Sgt Jack Tashiro

When I (HARADA) met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on the 1st, he said: "Although the Navy is very determined and the Army unsettled in regard to the Anti-Comintern problem, it seems that the Premier, knowing the contentions of the Navy to be proper, is favoring the Army. Now, the situation seems to be that he doesn't favor either side. Recently, the attitude of the General Staff Headquarters has become very good. Therefore, they have changed from before and it seems that they are reporting everything to the Emperor. I (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) think this is very fine. The Kwantung Army is systematically attacking Tomusk Sampeil (phonetic derivation) and the situation is contrary to the plans of the General Staff Headquarters. Therefore, the General Staff Headquarters is endeavoring to suppress the attacks at the present. If the Soviet Army has infiltrated east of the Khalkha River, we may destroy them. However, our Army will never cross the Khalkha River just to fight.

"In regard to the Tientsin problem, generally speaking, the Premier consents to the views of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, although they wish to make firm restrictions from the 1st of July, the Central Government has no control. Therefore, the units abroad do as they wish, and this situation is very troublesome. The strong argument by the Counsel in Tientsin and the comparatively strong attitude taken by Minister KATO, is

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somewhat regrettable. At any rate, that is the situation. The points over which Japan is concerned are: first, the addition of Japanese in the Industrial Bureau; second, the placing of Kempei within the concessions; third, the handing over of 45,000,000 Yuan of legal tender to the provisional government as a well meant gesture; fourth, cooperation to preserve peace; and fifth, the handing over of the criminals. . The stupidity of the War Minister has been the cause for all the disorder. The Emperor thought that the Chief of the General Staff might revise the authority or entrust greater authority to the Kwantung Army in regard to the Nomonhan Incident, so the Emperor issued special summons to the Premier and said: 'Are you (Premier) aware of this problem?' The Premier didn't know anything about this. This problem, that is, the real meaning of the revising of the entrusted authority by the Chief of General Staff is not to extend the authority, but to reduce it. Since the Emperor thought the command authority was to be extended, he (Emperor) talked to Premier HIRANUMA about the General Staff Headquarters. It seemed that the Premier was greatly troubled because ITAGAKI was so inconsistent."

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal continued in regards to Gen. UGAKI: "When Gen. UGAKI first became Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was saying the following: first, we will negotiate with CHIANG Kai-shek; second, make a sweeping change in the foreign policy; third, oppose the establishment of the Asia Development Board in regard to the disposition of the Sino-Japanese Incident; and fourth, the restoration of unification in the Army. But first of all, the reason why UGAKI failed

was because he was so unsure of his final decisions. There were instances like the Changkufeng Incident, where he told the Emperor that the use of military force was inadvisable. Yet, when the Minister of War told the Minister of Foreign Affairs that we may use arms, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told the Minister of War that he will keep it in mind. This became the reason why War Minister ITAGAKI received a severe reprimand from the Emperor at that time. When ITAGAKI told the Emperor that using arms was inevitable, the Emperor said: 'The Minister of Foreign Affairs said that it is not advisable to use arms at this time,' and did not sanction it. So, the War Minister had to hand in his resignation.

"Although he (UGAKI) was constantly speaking of the sweeping change in foreign policy, he sent Lt. Gen. OSHIMA as Ambassador to Germany which contradicts this. It seems that he (UGAKI) was helpless in regards to the unification of the Army. Furthermore, as to the reason for the rumor of a political change, KONOYE and the like would say: 'Unless the (strengthening of the) Anti-Comintern Pact is concluded, the Cabinet will collapse.' In other words, the Anti-Comintern problem is very crucial to the HIRANUMA Cabinet. It is said that since what HIRANUMA tells the Emperor and the actual facts are quite different, HIRANUMA is shirking his responsibilities. If things become topsy turvy no matter who is Premier, then it doesn't matter who it is. Therefore, the opinion is that HIRANUMA may as well remain.

"Furthermore, UGAKI, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that he would lay great stress on the powers of the

three nations at first and further Anglo-Japanese relation-sh.. However, these, too, were unaccomplished. I (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) heard that when he (UGAKI) was pressed by the English Ambassador, he (UGAKI) actually stormed at the Ambassador and I thought that a very poor thing to do."

I (HARADA) met the Minister of Foreign Affairs again and I confirmed the main points of the requests which were to be forwarded by Japan in regard to the Tientsin Incident. They are as follows:

1. The problem of surrendering the suspected assas-sinator of CHENG Shi-kang.
2. The problem concerning the cooperation in the han.. ng over of anti-Japanese elements within the concessions, after search and arrest.
3. The problem concerning the control of the anti-Japanese acts and the movements against the new political regime.
4. The problem of surrendering the silver within the concessions.
5. The problem of examining the Chinese banks within the concessions.
6. The problem of cooperation concerning the currency policy of the Federated Banks.

It was said that the above mentioned problems are to be presented at the Tokyo Conference.

On the morning of the 3rd, I (HARADA) went to Okitsu and met the P..nce and reported the information mentioned previously. The Prince said: "The criticism of the political party at this time is due to a narrow viewpoint. In brief, it is because the standard of the people is so

low. The recent press comments are so low that it may injure the national prestige. I (Prince) wonder if the government can't do anything about it." The Prince was quite worried and concluded: "I say this frequently, but what will happen if Germany wins? What is Japan going to do? If we bungle, we will be handled by the subject states and that is foolish." He (Prince) seemed worried about this too.

I (HARA , came home on the 4th and on the night of the 5th, I met KIDO. KIDO said: "There is nothing very important; just rumors."

On the evening of the 6th, Foreign Minister ARITA and Minister of Overseas Affairs KOISO, who were at the Kuwana, asked me (HARADA) to come about 9:00 o'clock so I went. ARITA said: "In this condition, diplomacy and everything else is impossible. This is very distressing. The attitude of the Premier is very indecisive and this too is very distressing."

Around midnight, MATSUDAIRA stopped over at my place and said: "I was frightened the other day. That is, while the War Minister was conversing with the Emperor for about two hours, the discontent of the Emperor exploded and His Majesty very bluntly said: 'There is no one as dumb as you.' It seemed that the War Minister was very frightened and no one can understand the situation. Through the Vice-Chamberlain, a Chamberlain asked the Empress of the situation and it seems that OSUMI and TERAUCHI are to be sent to Germany. When the Navy inquired into the intentions of the Emperor, it seemed that although the Army was acting properly, the War Minister talked doubtfully so the Emperor became angry. It also seems that all the

discontent came out at one time and I was requested to ask the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about this tomorrow. Through the Chief Aide-de-Camp, the Emperor said: 'The scolding is not meant for him (Minister of War) to quit, and it is not a problem of resigning. Tell him (War Minister) this so that he will understand clearly.' This matter ended without it becoming necessary for the War Minister to resign."

When I (HARADA) met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on the 7th, he was talking about the Emperor and the War Minister. He said: "The War Minister went to the Imperial Palace and spoke about Gen. TERAUCHI being sent to the Nazi Party Conference. Although the Navy was planning to send Admiral OSUMI at that time, there was no formal notice from the other (German) government. But since this is confidential, it hasn't been reported to the Emperor, nor has the Navy reported anything concerning this matter. The Emperor already knew that at the conference of the Supreme War Councillors, the War Minister reported that Foreign Minister ARITA favored the Military Alliance and he (Emperor) thought it very distressing.

"Furthermore, in regard to the sending of Gen. TERAUCHI, the War Minister stated to the Emperor that it is necessary to send Gen. TERAUCHI even for the reason of strongly binding the Anti-Comintern Pact spiritually. The Emperor did not think it very good and said: 'You (War Minister) know my opinions well. Even before, at the conference of the Supreme War Councillors, you reported the falsity that the Foreign Minister was in favor of the Military Alliance. That is very insolent.'

"Furthermore, when the Emperor asked about the

Tientsin Incident, the War Minister said: 'The reason why the Army requested the surrender of the 45,000,000 Yuan in the British Concession was to maintain the currency exchange.' The Emperor asked: 'Is that sufficient?' The War Minister said: 'No, it isn't.' The Emperor was shocked and said: 'That is very bad thinking on your part,' and rebuked him. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: 'The Army is confused and everything is lost.' He considered it a tragedy and even lamented to the extent that the Army was going to destroy the nation.

"The other day, the Emperor asked Premier HIRANUMA: 'Can't the anti-British activities be controlled?' The Premier replied: 'It is difficult to control.' The Emperor asked: 'Then, can't you show me the opposite side of the argument?' The Premier replied: 'I will consult KIDO and reply to you.'"

On the morning of the 8th, I (HARADA) met the Minister and the Vice-Minister of the Navy and discussed various things. Both the Navy Minister and the Vice-Minister were disgusted with the Cabinet.

I (HARADA) also met the Home Minister and after discussing the various rightist movements, the Home Minister said: "It is too bad that the Army is putting out the capital. When I phoned the Vice-Minister of the Navy about the discussion, he said: "If that is true, then let us expose the Army." But, I (HARADA) said: "Ask the Vice-Minister of Home Affairs and make sure."

On the night of the 8th, KOISO and ARITA were at the Kuwan and they called me up and said to come about 9:00, so I went. ARITA said: "This Cabinet is no good. It won't last long now." And he talked about the succeeding

Cabinet. Then I (HARADA) said: "Although public opinion favors ARAKI and KOISO, recent rumors have it that KOISO, the Minister of Overseas Affairs, in trying to show his position tries to be noticed and this is not good. It may be that the opposing party says such things as a check because they are afraid KOISO should emerge as a Cabinet leader. According to rumors, Gen. MINAMI, the Governor-General of Korea, is no longer a candidate for Premier, and all his supporters are dissapointed in him and are leading support to Gen. KOISO. We ~~must~~ be very careful." ARITA was asking KOISO who there was as War Minister, and KOISO was saying that TOJO is probably good. Then, ARITA said that KOISO is good in front of him (KOISO) and I (HARADA) said that if you were to compare now, I think ARAKI is much more popular.

I went home late that night and since I had some requests from Count MUTSU, I went to the home of ARAKI, the Minister of Education, and discussed various things for about two hours. It seemed that Gen. ARAKI was worrying about favoring Germany and Italy too much. I (HARADA) was telling Gen. ARAKI that I was worried also and he seemed to show the same sentiments.

I (HARADA) went to Chitsu on the night train and went to the home of the Prince on the morning of the 10th. He (Prince) also talked of his going to Gotemba on the 16th. The Prince said: "Although I do not know whether the representatives of the Foreign Ministry abroad are afraid of the Army while overseas, they try to win the favor of the Army and when they return to Japan they talk skillfully and flatter. By. But, notice the Tientsin problem; they do exactly as the Army there tells them to do. It is very

regrettable." I (HARADA) told him the various incidents that took place recently and left for Tokyo on the night train on the 10th.

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Chapter 333
(18 July 1939)

Anti-British Demonstrations

Translated by S/Sgt Jack Tashiro

When I (HARADA) came home on the 11th, anti-British activities had steadily increased. Although there were many billboards posted from before, these were increased and the anti-British demonstrations have become quite severe. Since the Anglo-Japanese Conference is to take place in Tokyo on the 15th with the intent to check (the English) and for other reasons, they (anti-British demonstrations) have spread to various areas.

I (HARADA) asked KIDO: "Why are the demonstrations so strong?" KIDO said: "Since the Kempei leads them and the Army finances them (anti-British demonstrations), we can't do anything about it." There are even rumors that the Police Bureau (Home Ministry) issues orders that it is permissible to have demonstrations if done in a legal way.

On the evening of the 12th, I (HARADA) was invited over by IKEDA Seihin and when I went there, Gens. KOISO and MATSUI, and Admiral NOMURA, YUKI and some wealthy people were there. It was a party with MATSUOKA Yosuke as the guest of honor. At the dinner table, there was much talk such as: "Isn't that (anti-British demonstrations) a little too severe?"

On the 13th, when I (HARADA) met KIDO, he said: "The other day, KOISO was saying this and that about the billboards and speeches, so I told him not to worry about such things." I (HARADA) was going to tell KIDO more, but since the relatives were here and it wasn't the time to tell him,

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I didn't say much more.

When I (HARADA) met ARITA on the 14th, ARITA said: "I am finally going to talk with CRAIGIE on the 15th, but it is very difficult. On the 13th, when I reported to the Emperor at Hayama, the Emperor asked: 'Are you planning to negotiate by leaving some margin? That is, try negotiating once and if the situation looks bad, think it over and take time in negotiating. Or is this negotiation to be done at one time?' So I (ARITA) replied that I will talk and leave some margin. The Emperor said: 'Then, that is good.'"

Since I (HARADA) was leaving for Shizuoka at 3:00 p.m. on the 15th, I had made previous arrangements. At 12:30 p.m., the 1st Anglo-Japanese Conference was over. When I (HARADA) inquired into the progress of the negotiations of the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs at his official residence, he said that the general conditions were explained by Foreign Minister ARITA. It seemed that the Foreign Minister said: "In all probability, this will be final. Although we have no grounds for compromise, it would be nice if you would manifest these. How about it?" ARITA expressed the following to CRAIGIE: "The British Government will recognize the large scale operations being carried out in China. The British Government will prohibit all actions which harm the peace or threaten the integrity of the Japanese Army in the Japanese occupied areas. England will agree to refrain from aiding China in the occupied areas and from taking such actions as to hinder the necessary measures for completing the previously mentioned objects of the Japanese Army." Then CRAIGIE said that to say the whole China is covering too much but it is

actually taking place in China so it can't be helped. And in regard to the other point - to say that England should agree to refrain from taking such actions that will hinder the necessary measures is too strong and it is too much like a blank power of attorney. Anyway CRAIGIE will think it over and will reply after the government is asked for instructions. Then Foreign Minister ARITA said that although this is secret, would CRAIGIE like to know what subjects to touch upon in regards to the Tientsin problem. CRAIGIE said that he would so ARITA brought up the six conditions and after seeing the few articles CRAIGIE thought that they (articles) could be generally recognized although he did not know what the British government would say. Anyway, CRAIGIE thought they could be recognized. Presuming that England would accept this proposal ARITA spoke somewhat optimistically. It seemed that ARITA was relieved that it was so simple for a much more difficult proposition had been expected of CRAIGIE.

SAWADA said: "Anyhow, the anti-British activities are very distressing. CRAIGIE didn't say a word about the anti-British activities in Japan to ARITA. Two or three nights ago, the Chief of the Metropolitan Police and the Chief of the Police Bureau (Home Ministry) were invited by MUTO Akira (original parenthesis: Deputy Chief of Staff, Tientsin) and got very drunk. It is very distressing because the Metropolitan Police Board and the Police Bureau are in such a condition."

I (HARADA) went to Okitsu on the 3:00 p.m. train on the 15th and I reported the general conditions to the Prince before he left for Gotemba on the 16th. The Prince

said: "The internal conditions are in a turmoil and it is very pitiful." He seemed very worried.

I (HARADA) returned to Tokyo on the night of the 16th and early the next morning, I (HARADA) met KIDO and said: "I thought the anti-British activities are too severe and since I was worried, I thought I would talk to you. However, you bluntly said: 'It is better to throw out the pro-British,' and also that I was worrying unnecessarily so I didn't say any more. What are you (KIDO) planning to do? My friends and predecessors who come over are deeply worried and they said that I know you well, and can't I tell you something. I generally tell them that you (KIDO) must have some idea of your own, so look the situation over for a little while longer and something may come out of it. Actually, I (HARADA) am very worried. You know your mind well, so what are you planning to do?" KIDO said: "The Ministers of Home Affairs heretofore, have haphazardly suppressed things so there are many instances when they have backfired and trouble issued. I (KIDO) am planning to let things take their course and then boldly suppress them.

"The other day, the Premier, the War Minister and I (KIDO) asked the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to come and we had a discussion. Since there is concern over the course the anti-British group is going to take when a decision is reached at the Tokyo Conference, it was planned to suppress them at that time. However, to have the Army disregard the issue and take the opposite side would be very troublesome. When I (KIDO) asked what was planned in regard to the problem, the War Minister said: 'As a matter of fact, the anti-British activities have

gone too far already and the Army is very worried about it. Naturally we (Army) wish to settle the issue; furthermore, we must calm down public opinion. We must get together and suppress them (anti-British movements).' I (KIDO) was greatly relieved and informed the Chief Secretary. I (KIDO) went home and passed on the news to the Army men under me. As a result, we are now making arrangements so that the issue will be carried out in a thorough manner."

I (HARADA) said: "Although this is a secret, a new suspect who was planning to assassinate the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was caught yesterday. According to him (suspect), it was their aim to eliminate the pro-British group such as Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA, YUKI, IKEDA and YAMAMOTO Isoroku. It is very regrettable that such a plot was planned against YAMAMOTO Isoroku for he is neither pro nor anti-British. Naturally, the others are like YAMAMOTO, but the aim of this group is to eliminate the group that they dislike, under the pretext of eliminating the pro-British. Knowing their aim very well, it seems funny that they were not suppressed. However, considering past circumstances, it seems very difficult."

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Chapter 334
(25 July 1939)

Arita-Craigie Talks

Translated by S/Sgt Jack Tashiro

On the night of the 17th, I (HARADA) met the Chief of the Police Bureau and talked over various things. The Director of the Police Bureau defended the government by saying: "The government is definitely not leading the anti-British activities." However, the public believes otherwise. This is very distressing. Leaving aside the question whether it is good or bad, the rightist groups believe that the elder statesmen and the other leaders that surround the Throne are all pro-British. They believe that for this reason, the national policy is not being carried out well. Also for the same reason, the foreign relations are poor and using these as their arguments, it is the aim of the rightists to eliminate all that they consider their (Rightist) opposition. The present Chief of the Police Bureau is a very able and fine man, so I talked without restraint. He was saying that the anti-British movements are rising up among the general public. I (HARADA) do not know whether he believes that or not.

After coming home, I (HARADA) talked with Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO over the phone and it seems that Representative OTAKE came to the Vice-Minister's home and he (OTAKE) said that the fact that the government backed anti-British activities is a very troublesome thing.

Furthermore, I (HARADA) talked with the Chief of the Metropolitan Police over the phone and said: "I talked with the Minister of Home Affairs and I (HARADA)

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am relieved." Since the Chief of the Metropolitan Police is quick tempered, he asked in return: "What are you worried about anyway?" I said: "Since KIDO is in a responsible position in regard to the anti-British activities, I (HARADA) doubt if there will be any mistakes. But if the people are misled, it would be troublesome so I am worried." He said: "I never thought you would have that opinion." I (HARADA) gave an appropriate reply and hung up. I thought it might be better if I met him (KIDO) and talked this over and, furthermore, I thought I would talk with Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA and then meet KIDO. However, the Chief of the Metropolitan Police felt that I (HARADA) shouldn't meet KIDO. The Chief of the Metropolitan Police himself is not bad personally and very likeable, but he is very serious and somewhat nervous.

On the morning of the 18th, I (HARADA) met Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO at the Navy Minister's official residence from 8:00 a.m. I (HARADA) called up the Minister of Foreign Affairs from there and he said that the Tokyo Conference between British Ambassador CRAIGIE and himself (Minister of Foreign Affairs ARITA) will probably start this afternoon. I told ARITA of KIDO's opinion. Yesterday, I (HARADA) had the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal tell the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at Hayama what I had heard from KIDO. Anyway, leaving aside the question whether the conference is a success or not, I (HARADA) thought it would be best to inform the Emperor of Home Affairs Minister's attitude. I (HARADA) told this to the Chief Secretary. The Chief Secretary relayed the message to the Lord Keeper of the

Privy Seal at Hayama yesterday.

Then, when I (HARADA) talked with Foreign Minister ARITA over the phone on the 19th, ARITA said: "The other day, after the Cabinet meeting at the Five Ministers' Conference, the War Minister said in regard to the Soviet problem, in other words, the boundary dispute of Nomonhan, that he (War Minister) wishes the problem transferred into diplomatic hands although it is in the midst of battle at the present. He persistently urged that this necessitates prompt action. Considering this point, he (War Minister) requested the Military Alliance with Italy and Germany be concluded promptly because it is absolutely necessary. Although the Navy Minister was silent, the Finance Minister and I (ARITA) considered that the Military Alliance and the Soviet problem had no connection; thus, we paid no heed to the War Minister. Later, it was heard that the Navy Minister also was in strong opposition towards the Military Alliance." Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO and Foreign Minister ARITA said: "Should Japan form a Military Alliance with Germany and Italy as the Army advocates, then this Cabinet will fall." The conference of the 19th was comparatively long for they conferred at intervals and they also conferred with the other officials.

I (HARADA) conversed with KONOYE on the phone and he said: "I am going to have luncheon with the War Minister at the Tokyo Club and I think we will be done about 2:00 p.m. I would like to know how the conference is progressing."

At about 2:00 p.m., MATSUDAIRA and I (HARADA) requested the presence of the Vice-Minister and Secretary OKUMURA at the Tokyo Club upon the request of the Foreign Minister, but the conference did not end at 2:00; it took until

eveni g.

On the 21st, I (HARADA) phoned ARITA to find out the conditions of the conference, but ARITA said: "Since I cannot meet you today, why not meet HOTTA and find out the situation?" So I (HARADA) had HOTTA come to the home of ARISHIMA and he said: "England must recognize the following: first, the problem of maintaining peace; second, necessary security for the existence of the Army; and third, necessity for removing all activities that are harmful to us, such as aiding the enemy. If England should say all is satisfactory, then England has to take all the responsibility and there is no limit to it. So, England wishes to have the limit of responsibility clarified. The problem is in what manner we are to clarify it (responsibility). It is very troublesome to have England so humble each time. Due to the existence of internal problems in England, the English have been misbehaving in China. For this reason, England was reprimanded by Japan and this was the cause for the Far Eastern policy of England to be changed. To have the public look at it in this manner is very distressing to the British Government. It seems that England's desire is to reach an agreement in such a manner so that the government can defend itself when the Parliament (British) is in session."

On the morning of the 22nd, I (HARADA) had Secretary OKUMURA come and he said: "Yesterday, the conference lasted from 11:00 until 12:45. CRAIGIE, with the premise that the instructions from the British Government came, expressed that the Japanese Army maintain its own protection and demand a special request for maintaining peace in the areas under its power. It was also said that the

removing of activities and causes that are harmful to the Japanese Army and beneficial to the enemy (Chinese), is too vague. Furthermore, to say that the policy that England has followed until now was a mistake, is not good. In regard to the two points (just mentioned), England expressed the same opinion as they did on the 19th. Foreign Minister ARITA criticized the English demands again. Regarding the first point, CRAIGIE said: 'We will refrain from inserting terms for reservation in this proposal; however, what do you think of the idea whereby this reservation is clarified in some way within the agreement?' Then, Foreign Minister ARITA said: 'That is not good. How about this? How about reporting this to your government?' ARITA explained the following to CRAIGIE verbally. The phrasing is as follows: 'The first part of this proposal does not give the British Government the liberty to protest to the Japanese Government, if unfortunately, there is a necessity for it in connection with each problem.' CRAIGIE said: 'That is fine,' so the first point was solved.

"It seemed that CRAIGIE had put forth a counter-proposal on the second problem but the Foreign Minister said: 'How about this?' and put forth two proposals. The first proposal was to explain the desire to curb such actions and measures unfavorable to Japan to the British administrative authorities and British nationals in China. The second proposal was to have the British authorities and British nationals recognize the above mentioned policy which refrains the British from taking actions and measures unfavorable to Japan. Then, CRAIGIE said: 'I think this is satisfactory. Although I think the first proposal is better, I will ask the British Government about it.'

I (OKUMURA) imagine that this will be accepted too.

"Then, the conversation went into the third stage and CRAIGIE said: 'According to the instructions from the British Government, they demand an explanation from Foreign Minister ARITA whether this proposal will have any effect on the obligations and positions of the other countries which have rights in China.' The Foreign Minister said: 'I do not understand what the British Government means.' CRAIGIE said: 'I do not understand what the British Government means either,' and was troubled. The Foreign Minister said: 'I cannot reply to something I cannot understand.' Then CRAIGIE said: 'I will ask the British Government once more.'

"Then, on the 4th section, CRAIGIE said: 'The instructions of the British Government are to get an explanation from Foreign Minister ARITA at this conference in regard to the controlling of the anti-British movements in China.' The Foreign Minister said: 'It is better not to talk of this problem.' CRAIGIE had the same opinion. Then, CRAIGIE said: 'In order to discuss definite matters on the Tientsin problem, I would like to propose the controlling of the anti-British movements which are related to the problem of preserving peace. I wish your acknowledgement on this.' The Foreign Minister said: 'I consent,' so the conference ended."

On the 23rd, MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and I (HARADA) went to the home of Foreign Minister ARITA and we conversed for three or four hours as we lunched. ARITA said: "When KONOYE met the War Minister the other day, the War Minister asked KONOYE if it is possible to change the Emperor's

mind in regard to the military agreement, and KONOYE replied that it is very difficult.

ARITA continued: "Even if this problem develops smoothly, the aftermath is complicated. As a result, the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan must be strengthened. Since the conditions in Europe are complicated, I (ARITA) think it is very troublesome. I personally think the military alliance is not a good thing. Therefore, concerning this, I think it is necessary for the whole Cabinet to change at this time. Furthermore, I think it is necessary to change the ambassadors overseas and the younger group of the Army who are actually doing the work."

I (HARADA) left for Oiso on the night of the 23rd. On the following morning, I sought the Prince at Gotemba and made a detailed report. Since I (HARADA) had received a letter from America's CASTLE, stating that the actions of the Japanese Army in Tientsin are incomprehensible, I told the Prince of this. The Prince said: "Ever since I was 13, I was somewhat interested in political conditions, but there never was a period when politics was so difficult to comprehend as at present."

On the way home, I (HARADA) sought KONOYE at Hakone. After having supper with him, we discussed various things and I (HARADA) went home to Oiso. Then, I heard that a formal negotiation in regard to the Tientsin problem was held from the 25th and it appears that this too, will be gradually finished so the Army circles are much happier than expected.

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Chapter 335
(5 August 1939)

Araki Primed for Premier

Translated by S/Sgt Jack Tashiro

On the night of the 24th, while I (HARADA) was having supper and discussing various things with KONOYE at Hakone, KONOYE said: "I think that ARAKI is the most acceptable as the next Premier. I think it would be nice if ARAKI and KOISO could get together, but there is no alternative besides leaving things as they are now. In regard to the Anti-Comintern Problem, the fact that we continued negotiations even though there was some inconsistency in the German and Italian proposals and our own, was the cause for all the trouble." I (HARADA) said: "There are many people saying that you should become a candidate for Premier, but it will not help you any nor do we think it best for you to become a candidate for Premier." Then, KONOYE said: "Naturally, I am not in favor of it either."

On the 25th, I (HARADA) returned to Tokyo and met the younger group from the Foreign Ministry at the Ryusui (restaurant) near the Sumida River. After a varied conversation, it seemed that even the Army's MUTO and KAWAMURA wish to settle the Anti-Comintern problem and the feeling that something will happen (concerning the Anti-Comintern problem) is strong.

On the same day, I (HARADA) met KIDO and asked of the latest conditions. It seems that nothing important has occurred, but there is danger that the principle of one in an assassination may become popular. There is fear that if the anti-British movements are carried out

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poorly, it may cause a revolution. Therefore, he (KIDO) repeatedly said that we cannot suppress them (the anti-British movements) clumsily. Then again, we cannot leave it alone, so it is a very difficult problem.

When I (HARADA) met Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO at the official residence of the Navy Minister on the morning of the 26th, YAMAMOTO said: "I was very determined, and I felt that I must quit. So, I told the Navy Minister of this about two months ago, but I cannot get his permission. In the Navy, no matter who takes the office, the traditions and administration of the Navy will not be affected. The Navy will not become so irresponsible as to consent to the military alliance with Germany and Italy, no matter who becomes Minister or Vice-Minister. Furthermore, although there are many possible successors as Navy Minister, Admiral NAGANO himself thinks he is a genius and if something should go wrong, it is possible that he (NAGANO) may suggest siding with the Army on the military alliance question. This responsibility lies with Admiral NAGANO. Although Admiral OSUMI is a possibility and can probably manage when the world is at peace, when extreme difficulty arises, his capabilities as a leader are doubtful."

I (HARADA) had a worried conversation with ARITA on the phone and ARITA said: "At any rate, I would like to conclude the Anglo-Japanese talks and they will probably be concluded. However, other problems arose and if the Premier should oppose them, then I cannot stay on with this job."

On the 27th, I (HARADA) went to Hayama and met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. MATSUDAIRA, the Chief

Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, accompanied me on the trip and we had a conversation on various topics. The Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "There was an actual plot to assassinate the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The anti-British movement, as I have previously mentioned, is actually domestic problem which arose in criticism of the advisers to the Throne, the so-called conservatives. However, at the same time, a portion of the Army and the Rightists under its command, desire to have their own Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. That is, so that the Army's desires will be accepted, they wish to place HIRANUMA or KONOYE, who will easily become robots of the Army, as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. They also want to cut in a Premier who will do whatever they (Army) want. Then, the Army can do whatever they wish. And I think that this idea (of the Army) is the objective of the domestic movements of today." We talked on various subjects, but it seems that there is no suitable successor as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

I (HARADA) conversed with IKEDA and KONOYE on the phone and their desire was to have the Anglo-Japanese talks end in great success.

On the evening of the 28th, KONOYE came to Oiso and we conversed at supper. It seemed that nothing new had occurred. KONOYE said: "On the 29th, Gen. MATSUI is to come to my place."

On the 30th, I (HARADA) went to Hakone and stayed overnight. Then, on the 31st, I sought the Prince and made a general report of the happenings until now. The Prince said: "Since the Army is holding away, I think

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the nation's fate is in great danger. If Japan unites with Germany and Italy, then the future of Japan is uncertain." The Prince was greatly worried.

The Prince also said: "It seems that Gen. UGAKI has politics and the actions of the so-called humanitarians of long ago mixed. To lead a person toward high morals is a good thing; however, in the matter of administration, it is important to settle the immediate problems. For instance, no matter how saintly CONFUCIUS was, the world was in confusion during his life in the CHOU Era. Now take KONOYE; his success is due to his so-called noble lineage, but it is regrettable that his character is so weak. Although KIDO is intelligent, he has the tendency, by nature, to lean towards the right. When I look at the recent reports of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, there are many stupid things. It seems that the officials of the Foreign Ministry, who are abroad, are acting under the orders of the Army. It is very distressing."

On the way home, I (HARADA) stopped at Hakone and met IKEDA and after having dinner, returned to Oiso together. Having made previous arrangements to meet the Foreign Minister on the 2nd, I conversed with him at his home. The Foreign Affairs Minister said: "As I said the other day, I told the Premier that the authorities concerned must change so that foreign diplomacy can be modified. That is, change the Cabinet and at the same time, change the leaders of the Army and the Foreign Ministry, and improve diplomacy. Furthermore, have both ambassadors overseas returned and straighten things out. At that time, the Premier didn't seem too pleased. I

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met TAKEUCHI who is trusted equally with Chief Secretary OTA who is a confidential friend of the Premier. TAKEUCHI wanted to meet me again this afternoon, so I did and asked him if he had ever asked the opinion of the Premier. TAKEUCHI said: 'It seems that the Premier has already considered resigning after accomplishing something because it is very irresponsible to resign and leave things in this state of disorder. But, it is useless to consider Gen. MINAMI or UGAKI for Premier. Although he (Premier) is not positive, it seems that ARAKI will be satisfactory. It also seems that when the Premier went to Hayama and stopped at Kanazawa to rest, he (Premier) considered all these facts carefully.'

"Since the Army is in a very difficult position, the vice-ministers and the bureau chiefs have the intention of having Germany reconsider the proposal of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact which had already received sanction from the Emperor. However, the younger Army groups have united and are saying that we must conclude a military alliance and they are very active. The War Minister is in a predicament and a faction is placing the responsibility for the failure of reaching an agreement on the military alliance on the War Minister. By placing the War Minister in such a position, the Cabinet will fall, and furthermore, they (younger group) are trying to get a Cabinet which leans towards the right. It is very complicated, but before anyone tells ARAKI, as an expert on foreign affairs, I (Foreign Affairs Minister) will tell ARAKI the course that was followed until now and what course is best to follow from now. Even if ARAKI does not become War Minister, it is

necessary for him to know these things. Since the conditions are as they are, if ARAKI should take over the succeeding Cabinet, then it is all the more necessary. It seemed that he (ARAKI) was very inquisitive so I (Foreign Affairs Minister) wish to talk to him at the earliest possible moment. It would seem odd if I (Foreign Minister) talk to him (ARAKI) directly, so when you have a chance, tell ARAKI to talk to me (ARITA)."

On the morning of the 3rd, I(HARADA) went to ARAKI's place and said: "The problems of foreign policy are very important and the intellectuals seem to be very worried about the anti-British movements. I did not come to your place by the orders of the Prince nor did I come here for your sake. I (HARADA) was deeply concerned with the affairs of the nation, but when I met the Minister of Foreign Affairs the other day, he said: 'It is a critical period and there are various rumors that there will be a political change. Anyway, it is necessary for ARAKI to thoroughly understand the foreign policy. Furthermore, I (Minister of Foreign Affairs) wish to speak frankly with Minister of Education ARAKI of these developments, my intentions and the present conditions of internal and foreign affairs. If you (HARADA) have an opportunity, tell Minister of Education ARAKI that I (Foreign Minister) feel this way.' That is why I (HARADA) asked you (ARAKI)."

The Minister of Education said: "I have been very worried too. I brought the question up when an agreement was reached on the proposal of the Anglo-Japanese talks at the Cabinet meeting the other day, but it seemed that the Premier did not consider it favorably."

I (HARADA) said to Minister of Education ARAKI:

"Although I mention this frequently, the most troublesome th g about the statesmen of Japan is that there are many who listen seriously to groundless rumors of some insignificant individuals and take the attitude of encouraging them. Such irresponsible acts are harmful to the cause of the nation. For instance, take the present Premier. Although he himself knows all the conditions very well, he pretends he doesn't know when it is convenient. It appears that he (Premier) is happy being a puppet of the so-called Rightists. For instance, the actions of former Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal SAITO and MAKINO or the present Lord Privy Seal, may be considered outrageous because of differences in opinion or they may not be considered qualified from a bureaucratic standpoint. However, it is clear to everyone that these men are not lacking in loyalty. When these low-class people come saying that these aforementioned statesmen are lacking in loyalty, our present-day statesmen don't reprimand these low class people, but speak irresponsibly as if they are of the same opinion and agree with these small characters. This makes one feel that they are insincere towards the Emperor. For instance, when someone says that Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal SAITO was outrageous, and this and that, our present statesmen should say that although I do not know the actual facts, I doubt if SAITO was that type of person. They have the moral responsibility to say that although his (SAITO) sentiments and his opinions are different from ours, as far as loyalty to the nation and to the Emperor is concerned, he (SAITO) is second to none. They should reprimand these riff-raff, but instead, they speak agreeably and

listen to the opinions of these low class people who are harmful to politics. They also take the attitude of encouraging these low class people and I (HARADA) want you (ARAKI) to bear in mind that these people are the cause of the undesirable results of today."

ARAKI said: "I am not too worried about the Rightists. If we act boldly, then they (Rightists) can be swayed. But the important question is, how the situation within the Army develops and how to control the situation if it does. I (ARAKI) know a lot about KOISO, the Minister of Overseas Affairs. His (KOISO) shortcoming is that he is full of tricks; for instance, recently when the problem of legal tender arose at the Cabinet meeting, he boldly said that we should use counterfeit. This is very distressing. He (KOISO) previously sent the Kempei to China and Manchuria disguised as laborers when it is the aim of Japan to establish a new order basing in the principles of virtue. His actions are contradictory, and I (ARAKI) think it is very harmful. KOISO has power and enthusiasm, but he is a person without a set policy and can be easily swayed by trickery." He (ARAKI) talked very badly of KOISO. In regard to the fact that KONOYE mentioned that he wished to unite ARAKI and KOISO, I (HARADA) thought it futile.

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Chapter 336
(14 August 1939)

Army Proposals Analyzed

Translated by S/Sgt Jack Tashiro

On the way home, I (HARADA) stopped at KIDO's place and related the conversation I had with ARAKI. KIDO said: "I wish to speak to ARAKI, and what I especially wish to speak to him about is not concerned with internal affairs, but with the Tokyo Conference. I wish to speak to ARITA so that the three of us, ARITA, ARAKI and I, can confer." So, I (HARADA) said: "That is very good. Have the talk." Then KIDO said: "Tell ARAKI and ARITA." I told both ARITA and Minister of Education ARAKI and they both understood it well. The three will meet at the earliest possible moment.

On the afternoon of the 3rd, I (HARADA) had dinner with Captain TAKAGI of the Navy. Captain TAKAGI said: "At the Cabinet meeting on July 22nd, when the Foreign Minister questioned the War Minister in regard to the differences in policy of the government in the anti-British acts in China and in Tokyo, the War Minister emphatically defended it. When the explanation ended, the Navy Minister stood up and said: 'In regard to this problem, it has been said in public that the Navy is weak and insolent. Furthermore, there are persons who thrust written material at us and strongly demand the resignation of the Vice-Minister and myself. We know that there is actually someone behind this action.' When he (Navy Minister) asked all those present to look back, the whole assembly became quiet."

Furthermore, TAKAGI continued: "When Captain ENDO,

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Naval attache in Berlin, explained the position of the Japanese Navy in regard to the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact to the Chief Secretary of the German Navy Ministry, he (Chief Secretary) expressed his intentions of agreeing. In other words, if war should break out between Germany-Italy and England-France, it would be fine if Japan maintains a friendly neutrality. After some time had elapsed, ENDO told this to OSHIMA. OSHIMA became very angered and through STAHMER, Secretary to RIBBENTROP, he (OSHIMA) said to RIBBENTROP: 'Does the Foreign Minister know?'

"According to a telegram that came into the hands of the Navy on the 2nd of August, Admiral FOERSTER, who was in Japan recently, returned to Germany and told ENDO: 'I went to Japan and was able to understand the intentions of the Japanese Navy in regard to this problem. I think the explanation of the Japanese Navy is just and righteous, so I would like to explain this to OSHIMA immediately. I will try my utmost to have the Ambassador from Japan voice sympathy with the contentions of the Navy. When the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, RAEDER, who is home on leave returns to Berlin, I will influence him and endeavor to aline matters with the policy pursued by the Japanese Navy.' This was written in the telegram."

On the 4th, the Five Ministers' Conference was held, and there is a rumor from a few days ago that the War Minister will propose that the Military Alliance, which is the contention of the Army, should be forced. On the 3rd, a meeting of the Big Three (Chief of Staff, Minister of War and Inspector General of Military Training) was held and as a result, it seemed that the strong argument

to be proposed by the War Minister at this time was postponed. According to rumors, a report on WANG Ching-wei was made at the Big Three Conference. According to further rumors, a successor for the War Minister is decided, but this rumor is groundless.

The die-hards of the Army strongly insist that they will fulfill their objective even if they have to change the War Minister or crush the Cabinet. There are moderates who say that since it has received Imperial sanction, it should be done over. According to actual stories, Gen. KOISO recently met CRAIGIE at the home of TOKUGAWA Yoshichika. They talked of cooperating with England in all respects and to bring this matter to an end. These are actual facts, but on the other hand, Lt. Col. IWAKURO and men like him, who are attempting to overthrow the Cabinet with Gen. KOISO as their leader, strongly insist on a military alliance with Germany and Italy. The Chief of the Police Bureau knew that a group of about thirty men of the rank of captain, plus OKAWA Shumei had gotten together and are doing this and that and also had gotten into Yoshichika's place. I (HARADA) also heard from KIDO that they had gotten into the Ministry of Home Affairs.

KIDO said: "The other day, when the Chief of the Police Bureau and his men and Lt. Col. IWAKURO were conversing, IWAKURO said: 'The anti-British movement was a great success and it appears that the Anglo-Japanese Conference will develop favorably. Therefore, we will advance towards the concluding of a military alliance with Germany and Italy and since we are planning to stage demonstrations at that time, please don't control the actions too strictly.' Then HASHIMOTO, the Peace Section Chief, became

ai gered an said: 'I an an official of the government, and as long as it has been decided not to have a military alliance with Germany and Italy as a national policy, then we (of the Police Bu eau) have the responsibility of c ntrolling the demons rations that oppose the national policy. Therefore, I (HASHIMOTO) c nnot undertake it.' He re ected it. Then the group of Army men said to HASHI OTO: 'Are you a spy of the Navy?' After that, the members of the Police Bureau parted but it appears that the Army thou ht they said too much. Therefore, they sent some of e younger group to apologize."

Since all the problems arising today are very muddled, I (HARADA) listened to the conversation and th ught that we must be very careful in all respects.

I (HA DA) heard that WANG Ko-min requested secretly to the American counselor that he wished to escape to Chungking on an American plane. The Navy intercepted the telegram which the counselor sent to the Secretary of State.

Concerning the problem of legal tender, I (HARADA) heard from the Department of Foreign Affairs that the American Government presented a warning to the Japanese Government. Furthermore, in regard to the problem of legal tender and silver, the reason the conference is stalled is be use the value of silver has a direct relation upon the various nations. In regard to the problem of silver, CRAIGIE wished to approve the wishes of Japan. Anyway, these two or three weeks are a very important period.

On the 3rd of July, when I (HARADA) met KIDO, he saw me to the front door and said: "The other day, when

the Emperor traveled to Hayama, I accompanied him and was granted an audience in the train for about twenty minutes. When I (KIDO) spoke in regard to public peace and order, the conversation developed into the subject of anti-British activities and I (KIDO) reported the circumstances of the unavoidable suppression of the anti-British activities. The Emperor said: 'It is a shameful thing that such things as anti-British activities occurred.' Although I wished to suppress and stop these anti-British activities, there is fear that in stopping them, public peace and order would be harmed."

Furthermore, KIDO said: "It would have been much nicer if ARITA and I could have gotten together before the Tokyo Conference. If things develop as such, then the internal conditions will become very complicated. If ARITA had talked to me once before, then I (KIDO) think there were other steps that we could have taken. It seems that KOISO is doing this and that and it is very troublesome."

I (HARADA) went home to Oiso and on the 6th, I went to Hakone. Then, I went to Gotemba on the 7th and the Prince said: "I think it better if HIRANUMA would resign immediately. If it is inevitable, ARAKI may do; but anyway, I wonder if there isn't anyone in the Army who is more capable."

On the way home, I (HARADA) stopped at Hakone and after I met IKEDA, I returned to Tokyo. That night, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and I met Admiral OKADA and we had dinner. Admiral OKADA was well informed on all matters and said: "Although I do not know [redacted] will become the central figure of the

new Cabinet, the Navy must maintain the succeeding Cabinet by giving them strong support." OKADA was told: "I wish you would speak especially to YONAI and YAMAMOTO." Admiral OKADA said: "Naturally, I will do my best." Then, we parted for the night.

Early on the morning of the 9th, I (HARADA) met Navy Minister YONAI and Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO (Navy), and it was said that when the War Minister visited the Navy Minister two or three days ago, the Navy Minister assailed the War Minister with questions. They felt sorry for the War Minister because he could not answer anything.

When I (HARADA) met the Foreign Minister on the morning of the 10th, I (HARADA) said: "At the Five Ministers' Conference of the 8th, the attitude of the Premier was very clear. The Navy Minister said to me: 'If the Premier had taken that attitude around June, things probably would not have developed this way. The reason why he can take such an attitude now is because he became carefree. If he had taken the attitude of being willing to resign at any time the situation requires, it would have been nice. It is very regrettable." The Foreign Minister said: "That is so."

Furthermore, the Minister was talking about the state of affairs of the Five Ministers' Conference. He said "The Premier stood up and said: 'The War Minister came the other day and explained the Army proposal. Since we had recognized the necessity of a treaty, we had done our utmost according to the pre-arranged plan. Although the War Minister says that this (Army's) proposal is not a hindrance to the pre-arranged plan, I (Premier) could

not think of it as such.' The Premier asked all the members of the Cabinet to ask questions, so various questions were asked. The contention of the Army is that the change of situation necessitates a military alliance. Its first step is to follow the pre-arranged plan. In the event that this cannot be done, the second step, that is, the conclusion of a military alliance is to be followed. The Premier asked the War Minister what he thought of it. The War Minister said that on one hand he is a State Minister, but at the same time, he is also War Minister. Therefore, in regard to the following of the pre-arranged plan as a State Minister, he is in favor of it. But, on the other hand, as a representative of the general opinion of the Army, he is also in favor of following the second course. As far as I (Foreign Minister) can see, it appears that there is some leeway in the unconditional alliance. It can also be thought of as the ousting of ITAGAKI."

The Foreign Minister continued; "The Finance Minister said: 'The most important thing for Japan to consider at this time is the settlement of this problem and the expansion of production. Therefore, the attitude of the United States requires much attention, and if the relations with the United States become bad, it will reflect on the Anglo-Japanese talks. Considering this from all angles, an alliance with Germany and Italy requires careful consideration. It is very bad to make the United States an enemy for the expansion of production and to save the present situation. Therefore, I (Finance Minister) am opposed to this problem.'

"The Navy Minister said: 'As a participant in the

Five Ministers' Conference, I am completely in favor of the statement made by the Premier previously. Although the Army predicts a great change in the international situation, I doubt it. To a certain extent, the Nomonhan Incident and the problem of renouncing the treaty with the United States was expected. Why not ask the Foreign Minister, a specialist, what he thinks of a change in the international situation?' I (YONAI) replied: 'If Japan makes a military alliance with Germany and Italy, then the unity between England and the United States will get much stronger. This is disadvantageous to Japan. Therefore, I don't think there is any necessity to alter the pre-arranged plan just to please Germany and Italy. Although the Army says that that is isolation, this is not a disadvantageous isolation but an advantageous one, so there is no need for worry.' The Premier asked the War Minister if the main point within the Army proposal meant hindering the pre-arranged plan, the War Minister had said it does. The Premier said very clearly that he cannot present anything other than the pre-arranged plan which had already received the sanction of the Emperor.

Considering the present condition of the Army, it is futile to follow the first section so I think it better to quit. However, since it is necessary to leave some reserve in the Cabinet and to have changes, with the expectancy that the worst will come in regard to taking steps even if it is futile, we purposely did not determine the method and put it off. If you are to follow the first section, in what manner will you give out the instructions? If you are to do this, the

Army's so-called first section is no good; and there is no alternative but to have both plenipotentiaries forward the final written instructions to the respective governments. Since this differs from the intentions of the Army, OSHIMA probably will not forward it."

Foreign Minister ARITA concluded: "Although the Premier says that he will follow the pre-arranged plan, in regard to the three steps of the Army, and the stopping of the documenting of the agreement on the first step, he rejects it. In regard to the omitting of the matters of reservation in the second step and the approval of the negotiations of OSHIMA in the third step, the Premier rejects only the first step and he doesn't say much about the second and third ones. Therefore, there is some doubt left."

On the afternoon of the 10th, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and I went to see the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at Hayama. The Lord Privy Seal was informed by the conversations with Foreign Minister ARITA and he said: "Since the second and third conditions are included in the first condition of the Army terms, if the Premier rejects the first, then it is the same as rejecting the second and third. There will be no danger."

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal continued: "The Emperor said to Premier HIRANUMA: 'In regard to the supreme command; in other words, the Army; if anything complicated arises, bring it to me and I shall solve it.' But, since it is not good to trouble the Emperor, it seems the intention of Premier HIRANUMA to request aid only in difficult situations. HIRANUMA was very resentful and said that

he was troubled concerning the independence of State Affairs and the Supreme Command.

"The Emperor tells those near him: 'I wonder if it is all right for me to stay here when conditions are as they are now.' The Emperor is very worried. I always tell the Emperor that I shall inform him when necessary, so for the sake of his health and since it is better if he rests, please do not worry."

Furthermore, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "The Emperor ordered: 'Can't the anti-British activities in China be suppressed?' to His Highness the Chief of the General Staff. His Highness replied: 'It cannot be done at once, but it will be accomplished gradually.'"

On the 11th, I (HARADA) talked with ARITA over the phone, and he said: "The feelings of the Army have cooled somewhat. Among the reports, it is said that the Army is very angry because the War Minister was tricked at the Five Ministers' Conference. And the extremists are saying that if possible, they will proclaim martial law and make a military Cabinet."

On the 11th, I (HARADA) went to Gotemba and made a general report to the Prince. The Prince said: "If it is possible to recall the two ambassadors overseas, that is the principal problem. If is depressing because most of the officials overseas are influenced by the militarists and by Germany. We must do something about this. Instead of considering the use of documents, I (Prince) think it is more important to change the personnel. I wonder if it would be very difficult."

Then, I (HARADA) came through Hakone and returned home. On the morning of the 12th, I sought Home Affairs

Minister KIDO and he said: "I met KONOYE last night and he was saying that he was rather doubtful of ARAKI becoming the leader of the succeeding Cabinet and that he prefers HIROTA. KONOYE met HIROTA the other day and his opinions were very similar to the Army's. Since HIROTA is optimistic and acts intelligently, he should do. It is beside the point whether HIROTA will accept or not. I (KIDO) haven't actually met HIROTA yet. I think it better if we do not tell all these things to ARAKI so let's just observe quietly." I (HARADA) naturally agreed. Then, KIDO said: "It seems that the Premier has decided to change just the War Minister and settle down."

On the morning of the 13th, I (HARADA) called up ARAKI and said: "The problems have become very complicated and if misunderstanding is created, it is bad. Consequently, I will not meet you often from now and I think it better if I refrained from telling you everything. The government has become settled, so will you bear this in mind?"

Then, on the afternoon of the 13th, SAKAMOTO, the former Chief of the Kempei-tai, came and said that the younger faction of the Army is very excited and this and that. He was very worried so I (HARADA) said: "Anyway, the Premier and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal are to meet at Hayama tomorrow. It would be nice if you went to some hotel in Hayama first and talk to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal." He (SAKAMOTO) made arrangements with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and left for Hayama early on the morning of the 14th.

In the meantime, I (HARADA) talked with ARITA on

the phone in the morning, and ARITA said: "Since yester-d--, the attitude of the Army has been more peaceful." So I (HARADA) reported this immediately to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

We cannot see through the Anglo-Japanese talks. But, in over-all perspective, it seems that they consider success a possibility. It is said that a faction of the Army, including Maj. Gen. MUTO, who are overseas, are saying that they will return for the time being.

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Chapter 337
(23 August 1939)

Rumors on Cabinet Impasse

Translated by Lieut. Morio Morihara

On the 15th, MATSUDAIRA said: "The Army is exceedingly dissatisfied with the attitude of the Premier. They say that when the War Minister and the Premier met for the first time, the Premier did not say definitely that he could not move outside already established policies at that time, and that he would have reconsidered if the Navy Minister was in agreement as the result of discussions. They say that he was very vague in his assertions."

I then met Foreign Minister ARITA, who said: "It will probably be possible to open the Five Ministers' Conference on Friday, which is the 25th. However, since there is a great gap between the Foreign Ministry's proposal and that of the Army, they will surely clash. The Chief Cabinet Secretary was also looking at this pessimistically, and optimism as of former days, is not possible. Isn't there a danger that it will change - although there may be none on the surface?" The Foreign Minister was doubtful.

I went to Gotemba on the 16th and as usual, related all of the happenings to the Prince. The Prince said: "Everything is low class. Japan is surely in a fix. In short, this is because of basic education. In spite of this being an entirely different age, Japanese education is still based on the days of the civil wars. Therefore, they do not seem to realize that the world is changing day by day. It is because they go by such policies, that

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Japan is no good. I'll look the situation over."

When I returned to Oiso, there were various rumors. The former Chief of the Kempei-tai said that the following was the information received from Army circles: It was everyone's conclusion that the present Cabinet was working for the promulgation of another Imperial edict by attempting to influence the Genro and other officials close to the Throne.

They are influencing the Genro and the other officials so that when the War Minister should resign alone, there will be an Imperial message naming a successor because it is difficult to obtain a succeeding War Minister. Concerning the proposal for a Military Alliance, Premier HIRANUMA is not deviating a bit from the basic proposal which was reported to the Emperor and which had his sanction. This was not good. If the Five Ministers' Conference is to be opened by a proposal of the Foreign Ministry, the Army would attack it. Therefore, many quarters are saying that the present conference should be delayed as much as possible in order to soften the atmosphere which exists in the Army. Preliminary steps should be taken during this time and when they are about to be realized - then the important decisions should be made. These assertions are very arbitrary, and they are highly irregular. However, they are talking of the present Cabinet, the Genro and other officials as if they were all true.

I (HARADA) told SAKAMOTO by letter that it was absolutely outrageous to falsify facts. However, more than that, concerning the decisions of the Five Ministers' Conference which had Imperial approval, the War

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Minister was in it too. In spite of this, to put through the German-Italian-Japanese Military Alliance, was being too high handed. Again, such acts which did not respect the true relations of sovereign and subjects must be considered as a fundamental problem. I wrote clearly that there was absolutely no such relationships between the Genro, the other officials and the present Cabinet.

After that, I went to Hayama and inquired of the details from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The Lord Privy Seal said: "This morning, at 9:00 o'clock, the Premier had an audience with the Emperor. After that, I met the Premier. The Premier said that he would like to see the success of the Japan-British talks, but the Army was doing as it wished, and it seemed as if they were obstructing the conclusion of this. However, I still have faint hopes. From a diplomatic standpoint, when we consider the standpoint of present day Japan, it is a golden opportunity. However, it is extremely regrettable that there should be petty squabbles over a Military Alliance, etc."

The Lord Keeper said: "Until today, I had considerable faith in the War Minister, but his recent attitude is very queer. It's not only his brains that are bad." The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was very dissatisfied with the War Minister, and he continued: "Even the present Army is not that undiscerning. There are only a few men doing the agitating, and they all resort to personal feelings. They only think of winning or losing, and whenever the Army's proposal does not pass, they consider that they've lost and become infuriated. These circumstances might lead them to misjudge the main

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issues and it is very dangerous. The Premier has also said that because there are various rumors flying around, he cannot shirk his responsibilities and resign now. There is no appearance of tenseness about the Premier. The Premier reported frankly and minutely of his opinions to the Emperor, and the Emperor also replied: 'I am very happy that I am able to grasp the true significance of the actual situation.' If there should be a political change at this time, there is the fear that this will be the basis of complete collapse, so I would like them to continue in the face of all difficulties." That was the Lord Keeper's opinion.

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "The Emperor cannot understand Premier HIRANUMA's optimistic attitude concerning financial matters. It somehow seemed to be mistaken for the Army and HASHIZUME incidents. According to the Premier's story, the War Minister is making false statements. The other day, the Premier said that since telegram No. 326 was already issued, it was not possible for him to exceed its scope. If the various situations changed, and the opinions changed as a result of an Army-Navy agreement, he would also reconsider. But, at the present time, he could never agree to an all-out military alliance. The War Minister relayed the same statement to the Navy Minister. Still, when he returned to the War Ministry afterwards, the War Minister purposely said to the people in the Military Affairs Bureau: 'The Premier fooled me. He agreed at first, and then opposed it later.' They have not yet decided to hold the Five Ministers' Conferance on the 22nd. The meeting scheduled on the 18th was postponed according to the

wishes of the War Minister, and in spite of this, the War Minister is broadcasting that the Premier postponed it. The Premier told me that it was not good to resign as a result of clashing with the Army. Therefore, he would like to resign after the situation improved."

On the other hand, among some of the rumors in circulation, there are some that are saying that the pro-British faction is planning the downfall of the Cabinet. They are the ones that do not desire the responsibility of a Cabinet collapse to be put on the Army and are trying to get the jump on the others by putting the blame on the pro-British faction. They are even saying that KABAYAMA and YOSHIDA are scheming to send HIROTA abroad.

On that day, I had agreed to meet MATSUDAIRA at Hayama. Before he came, he was summoned by Prince CHICHIBU and was received in audience by His Highness. He had also met the Minister of Home Affairs and Foreign Minister ARITA, and MATSUDAIRA related the following in his conversation with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: "Prince CHICHIBU asked me: 'What is the opinion of the general public about this Military Alliance? How do they feel?' I replied: 'Generally, the facts relating to the Japanese-British talks are simple, and it is easy to pass judgment on it, but this Military Alliance is exceedingly complicated and the intellectual class especially, is having difficulty in forming an opinion.' The Prince said: 'This issue must be that way.'"

It seems that the Prince summoned KIDO also and asked the same question as he did of MATSUDAIRA. His Highness said: "If this Cabinet should resign, how about KONOYE?" KIDO replied that KONOYE was not suited.

The Prince further questioned KIDO, and asked him if there wasn't a solution. The Prince said: "It is undesirable that the Cabinet should change as a result of this problem: that is, the Military Alliance issue."

In short, according to the Prince's (KONOYE) opinion, he desired that the responsibility of Cabinet resignation be diverted from the Army. The Prince inquired: "How about changing our Ambassadors stationed in Germany and Italy? What if the Premier himself should go and visit HITLER and MUSSOLINI in Germany and Italy?" Thereupon, KIDO said: "It would be injurious to the national dignity to have the Premier go. The effects would be bad." At the same time, it is not possible to change the Ambassadors at so late a time, and although it isn't impossible for the Premier to go, his visit itself would be a problem. That was how KIDO replied. KIDO said: "The Cabinet does not look as if it will continue for a while longer. The Five Ministers' Conference probably will not be held on the 22nd."

HATSUDA said: "In the end, we wonder if the Army isn't thinking of saving their face, more than the country's. The Prince said to me: 'I wonder if it wouldn't be possible for the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to caution the administration.' I replied: 'It is not good for the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to caution the Cabinet in regard to its policies. He should refrain from interfering with the policies of the administration except when there is something between the Emperor and the Cabinet, or when replying to an Imperial inquiry.' That was what I said."

At Hayama when the Premier was going to part from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, he said: "Probably,

the Army will urge me tomorrow to go to Europe. However, I will not go to Europe."

I went to Gotemba and reported everything. The Prince said: "Somehow it doesn't make sense. It is like a dream."

I returned to Oiso on that day, and that evening, there was a telephone call from the Tokyo newspapers. They reported that a Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia had been concluded. If this was true, the Military Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy would be automatically dissolved and the situation would be such that a change in the political situation would be inevitable. Just as I was thinking this, there was a telephone call from Tokyo which stated that the Army was very much weakened, and the Cabinet also seemed to be in trouble. There are suggestions for me to return to Tokyo, but it is not good to do various things while excited, and I plan to watch the situation one more day.

KONOYE returned from Kamakura to attend the funeral services of Prince FUSHIMI. There are some that are taking this to mean that a political change is impending, and are spreading various rumors.

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